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Several  economic  distortions  are  integrated  into  a  fully  dynamic  general-equilibrium 
framework  to  investigate  the  welfare  effects  of  monetary  policy.  The  model  considers 
intermediate goods and two consumption good sectors that rely to different degrees on inputs 
from abroad. We further assume that an equal input bias in the production of consumption 
goods exists in the world. The welfare effects of monetary policy in the home and the foreign 
country  crucially  depend  on  their  degree  of  interdependence  and  the  competitiveness  of 
markets. Monetary policy may have adverse beggar-thyself effects if the mutual dependence 
is considerably high. The foreign country benefits from a home monetary expansion unless 
the competitiveness of markets is too low. 
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1  Introduction 
A central issue in international macroeconomics is the welfare effects of monetary policy. 
What the welfare consequences for domestic agents are, and how monetary adjustments are 
transmitted to other economies, are key questions in this respect. The conventional wisdom 
that an expansionary monetary policy is beneficial for the expanding country and detrimental 
for the rest of the world, has been questioned and qualified in recent theoretical work by 
Obstfeld  and  Rogoff  (1995,  1996).  In  their  studies,  an  expansionary  monetary  policy 
anywhere in the world benefits all countries equally. Monetary policy thus does not generate 
the  familiar  beggar-thy-neighbor  effects  but  rather,  prosper-thy-neighbor  effects.  Several 
papers have since modified the Obstfeld and Rogoff framework through the consideration of, 
e.g., non-traded goods (Hau 2000), a limited pass-through of exchange rate changes (Betts 
and Devereux 1996, 2000), different degrees of substitutability between varieties of home 
goods and between domestic and foreign goods (Corsetti and Pesenti 2001a, Tille 2001), a 
home bias (Michaelis 2002, Warnock 2003) and a production process consisting of more than 
one stage through the inclusion of intermediate goods (Obstfeld 2001, Bacchetta and van 
Wincoop 2002) or distribution services (Tille 2000). Beggar-thy-neighbor effects re-appear in 
a number of these models. Even the possibility of a detrimental beggar-thyself effect for the 
expanding country emerges (see, e.g., Tille 2001).  
In this paper, a framework is presented that tries to capture the logic and the implications of 
several of these features and that allows for an explicit exploration of their interaction. We 
suppose that the production process consists of more than one stage. Each country produces a 
continuum of differentiated intermediate goods. These intermediate goods are used to produce 
consumption goods in two sectors that to different degrees rely on inputs from abroad. By 
altering the relative size of the consumption goods sectors the openness of the economies can 
be varied. An “input bias” in the production of consumption goods might prevail, implying 
that for given relative prices home consumption goods firms demand relatively more home 
produced inputs than foreign consumption goods firms. Thus, the model allows for a variation 
in the interdependence of the economies.  
Both the assumption of two consumption goods sectors with a different need for inputs from 
abroad  and  the  input  bias  limit  the  responsiveness  of  domestic  prices  to  exchange  rate 
changes. Exchange rate fluctuations may be completely passed-through to import prices but 
hardly affect consumer prices and the CPI. This is in accordance with the results of empirical   2 
work (see references given below). Basically, our approach accounts for two stylized facts 
that emerged from the empirical literature. First, prices move less than one to one with the 
exchange rate and second, consumer prices are much less affected than import prices. In fact, 
the pass-through to consumer prices has been found to be close to zero.
1 A low pass-through 
to  consumer  prices  of  course  means  that  exchange  rate  changes  do  not  give  rise  to  a 
considerable redirection of global consumption spending. But, exchange rate movements may 
lead  to  a  substitution  effect  on  the  firm  level.  Obstfeld  (2001)  points  out  that  sourcing 
decisions by firms are to be considered as a major channel through which exchange rate 
movements  influence  trade  flows  and,  hence,  aggregate  demand  for  countries’  outputs. 
Following this argument, in this model the effects of monetary adjustments and exchange rate 
changes originate in the firm level.  
In  our  model,  the  results  crucially  depend  on  three  parameters.  The  input  bias  in  the 
production of final commodities, the relative size of the consumption goods sectors and the 
elasticity  of  substitution  between  home  and  foreign  input  goods  are  key  for  the 
macroeconomic  effects  and  the  welfare  implications  of  a  monetary  policy  change. 
Consequently, the focus of our analysis lies on the impact that different values of the model’s 
key parameters have on the model’s results.  
The model’s main results can be summarized as follows. Generally, the impact of a home 
monetary policy change is not unambiguous for both the home and the foreign country. An 
expansionary  monetary  policy  is  more  likely  to  be  beneficial  for  the  expanding  country 
(prosper-thyself) the less open the economy is and the less dependent the economy is on 
inputs  from  abroad.  Moreoever,  the  more  competitive  markets  are  (i.e.  the  greater  the 
substitutability between home and foreign goods), the more likely is a prosper-thyself effect 
of  monetary  policy.  A  detrimental  effect  of  an  expansionary  monetary  policy  on  the 
expanding country’s welfare (beggar-thyself) is possible for a relatively open economy that is 
strongly linked to the rest of the world. Comparatively large monopolistic distortions increase 
the probability of an adverse beggar-thyself effect. The rest of the world most likely benefits 
from a home monetary expansion (prosper-thy-neighbor). Only in the case of a high degree of 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (2001) and McCarthy (1999) for evidence on pass-through 
to consumer prices and, e.g., Goldberg and Knetter (1998) and Campa and Goldberg (2002) for evidence on 
pass-through to import prices. See Goldberg and Knetter (1997) for a review of the literature and Engel (2002) 
for a review of new approaches in the theoretical literature.   3 
substitutability between home and foreign goods does the familiar beggar-thy-neighbor effect 
become possible.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section the model is developed. In 
section 3 the model is log-linearized around an initial steady state. Section 4 presents the 
closed form solutions and section 5 is devoted to the welfare analysis of monetary policy. The 
effects of money supply changes on home and foreign welfare are derived and a numerical 
example is presented. Section 6 concludes. 
2  A Two-Country Model 
The world economy  consists of two equally sized countries inhabited by a continuum of 
household  and  of  intermediate  and  final  goods  firms  of  mass  one.  Agents  over  the  [ ] 1 , 0  
interval live in the home country, while agents in the [ ] 2 , 1  interval are residents of the foreign 
country. Analogously, goods over the  [ ] 1 , 0  interval are produced in the home country while 
goods in the [ ] 2 , 1  interval are produced in the foreign country. In the following sections, only 
the  equations  for  the  representative  home  agent  and  the  representative  home  firm  are 
presented. Mirror images hold for the foreign country (the equations for the foreign country 
are given in Appendix A). 
2.1  Households 
The intertemporal utility of the representative home agent is given by a time seperable utility 






















log C log U , 
where  b,  1 0 < b < , is the discount rate. C denotes a consumption index defined below; M 
denotes the domestic money stock, P is the consumer price index (also defined below) and h 
is the hours worked.  
Consumption goods are produced in two sectors denoted by  I  and  II. Let 
i
t C  denote the 
consumption  good  produced  in  sector  II , I i = .  Households’  preferences  over  the  sector-
specific consumption goods are given by   4 
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where  ( )
t 1 t t 1 t
- - - = l . The Cobb-Douglas aggregation implies that the substitution elasticity 
between goods from sectors I and II is equal to one. The consumer price index (CPI) defined 
as the minimum money expenditure required to purchase one unit of the consumption basket 
can then be derived as 









t P   denotes  the  price  of  the  consumption  good  from  sector  II , I i = .  Households’ 
demand for the consumption goods from both sectors is: 
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Households hold two assets, domestic money,  t M , and a riskless real bond,  t B , which is 
denominated in terms of the consumption index  t C . With  t r  being the bond’s real rate of 
return (between periods  1 t -  and t), households’ intertemporal budget constraint is: 




t t t 1 t t t T P C P B P r 1 M h W B P M - - + + + p + p + = + - + .  
Nominal wealth carried over into the next period consists of nominal balances and bonds 
(l.h.s.)
2 and is derived from labor income where  t W  is the domestic nominal wage, from 
wealth at the beginning of period t ( ( ) t t t 1 t B P r 1 M + + - ) and from the agents’ (equal) share of 




t p + p )
3, less the expenditure 
for consumption and taxes.  t T  denotes real lump-sum taxes in terms of the consumption index 
t C . 
Maximizing lifetime utility subject to the budget constraint (5) yields agents’ optimal choices.  
                                                 
2 Following the notation of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),  t M  denotes the stock of money held by a household 
entering period t+1.  
3 For simplicity it is assumed that all firms are wholly owned by the residents of the country they are located in.   5 
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Equation (6) is the familiar Euler equation for the optimal intertemporal consumption path. 
Equation (7) gives the consumption based money demand, where  t i  denotes the nominal 
interest  rate  which  is  defined  as  ( ) ( ) t 1 t t t P P r 1 i 1 + + = + .  At  the  margin,  households  are 
indifferent between spending their ressources for a further unit of C and holding them as real 
balances. Equation (8) reflects the optimal labor supply. The marginal disutility of providing 
an extra hour of work must equal the marginal utility of consuming the additional earnings. 
2.2  Firms and market structure 
We  differentiate  between  final  consumption  goods  and  the  intermediate  goods  needed  to 
produce them.
4 In both countries, intermediate goods producers enjoy a degree of monopoly 
power.  Both  countries  operate  the  same  technology.  The  production  of  a  differentiated 
intermediate  good  only  requires  labor  input,  t t h y = .  Since  the  production  technology  is 
identical for all firms and the elasticity of demand is the same in all intermediate  goods 
markets, all producers behave identically to one another. They produce the same amount of 
goods  and  charge  the  same  price.  Output  and  prices  can  therefore  be  interpreted  as 
representative and hence indexes are omitted most of the time.  
The final commodities are competitively produced by bundling a continuum of differentiated 
intermediate goods. The two consumption goods sectors can be distinguished by the inputs 
required in the production process. While in sector I both home and foreign intermediate 
goods need to be combined to produce a sector-I-consumption good, producers in sector II 
only need the intermediate goods of their respective country, i.e. no input from abroad is 
required.  
                                                 
4 Intermediate goods are also considered by, e.g., Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) and Obstfeld (2001).   6 





























t y Y = . 
Following Obstfeld (2001) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002), we assume that final 









t C Y = . 
h
t y  (
f
t y ) is a basket of home (foreign) produced intermediate 
goods.  g ( 1 > g ) is the substitution elasticity between the home and foreign baskets. The 
home bias in production (“input bias”) is reflected in the parameter a,  1 0 £ a £ .
5 Home and 
foreign producers have an identical bias for the domestically produced intermediate good 
(
* a = a ). For  5 . > a , there is a home bias in production. At given relative prices, home 
producers will demand relatively more home produced input goods than foreign producers. Of 
course, even if a home bias exists, home firms may demand more foreign inputs than home 
inputs in absolute terms if the relative price of the home produced input goods is sufficiently 
high. The reverse is the case (foreign bias) for  5 . < a , and the ratio of home and foreign 
inputs will be the same in the home and foreign country if  5 . = a . 
The intermediate goods baskets are in turn CES aggregates across home and foreign brands. 
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Intermediate goods in the interval [ ] 1 , 0  are produced in the home country, while goods in the 
interval  [ ] 2 , 1   are  produced  in  the  foreign  country.  For  simplicity,  we  assume  that  the 
substitution elasticity  j  ( ) 1 > j  is identical in both economies. We further assume that the 
substitutability  between  goods  from  the  same  country  is  higher  than  between  home  and 
foreign goods,  g ³ j  (Tille 2001).  
Because of perfect competition, the prices of consumption goods equal firms’ marginal cost 
so that the profit of final goods producers is zero in equilibrium. In sector I, final goods 
                                                 
5 See Michaelis (2002) and Warnock (2003) for the analysis of a home bias in consumption in a new open 
economy macroeconomics model.    7 
producers’ marginal costs are equal to the intermediate goods price index 
er int





t P P = . 
er int
t P  is given by: 
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t p  and 
f
t p  are price indexes (in home currency) that correspond to the intermediate goods 
bundles 
h
t y  and 
f
t y  and are given by: 
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t di p S p , 
where  t p  (
*
t p ) denotes the price of a differentiated home (foreign) intermediate good in home 
(foreign) currency.  t S  is the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of one unit of foreign 
currency in terms of home currency. In sector II, the marginal production costs depend on the 
price of the domestic intermediate good basket used as the input. The price of a sector II 




t p P = .  
Since  there  are  no  restriction  to  international  trade,  the  law  of  one  price  holds  for  all 
differentiated intermediate goods, i.e. firms set their prices in the producer’s currency. Profit 
maximization  requires  that  the  monopolistically  competitive  intermediate  goods  firms  set 






= .  
The demand for home varieties of the intermediate goods is given in equation (13).  
(13) 
( )

















































































































The  demand  for  a  differentiated  home  input  stems  from  both  home  consumption  goods 
sectors (reflected by the first term in brackets and the last term on the r.h.s.) and from the   8 
foreign consumption goods sector I (reflected by the second term in bracktes). Equation (13) 
implies that the parameter t can be interpreted as reflecting the degree of openness of both 
economies. Trade between both countries only exists for positive values of t. If t is equal to 
zero both countries are closed economies. All consumption goods are produced in sector II so 
that there is no need to import goods from abroad. 
2.3  Government and the Current Account 
Government spending is assumed to be zero in each country so that the government budget 
constraint  is  1 t t t t M M T P - - = - .  The  current  account  equation  can  now  be  derived  by 
aggregating over the individual budget  constraint (5) (thereby observing that  0
final
t = p  in 
equilibrium  due  to  perfect  competition)  and  taking  account  of  the  government  budget 
constraint given above.  
(14)  ( ) t t t 1 t t t t t t B P r 1 B P p y C P + - + = - . 
3  The Log-linearized Model 
The model is analyzed in terms of percentage deviations around an initial symmetric steady 
state. The complete log-linear model as well as an explanation of its derivation is given in 
Appendix B. Three time periods are considered. The economy starts in the zero-steady state. 
In the middle period (the short run), a permanent monetary shock occurs. This period is 
characterized by nominal rigidities. Prices are predetermined in the short run and cannot be 
adjusted. In the next period, the economy moves to a new steady state, called the long run, in 
which all prices adjust instantaneously. To analyze the effects of monetary policy, we proceed 
by first looking at the long run and then turning to the short run. The policy experiment 
considered is a permanent increase in the relative home money supply.  
3.1 The Long Run (Steady State Changes) 
In the long run, firms adjust their prices according to the mark-up rule and households adjust 
their optimal labor supply according to equation (8). A bar over a variable indicates a long run 
change in a variable from the initial steady state to the new steady state (time subscripts are 
omitted). We look at cross-country differences defined as 
* - = D X X X . Log-linearizing the 
model yields, for the new steady state:    9 
(15)  ( ) ( )t a - - + = D 1 t 2 1 S P   
(16)  ( ) C 1 t 2 h D - t a - = D   
(17)  ( )
II I C t 1 C t C Y D - + D = D = D  
(18)  ( ) ( )B 1 2 1 t 2 y C b - + t a - = D - D  
(19)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) [ ]t ag + a - - a - - D a - - = D 1 t 1 1 t 4 C 1 t 2 1 y  
(20)  h y D = D  
(21)  ( ) ( )t a - - + + D = D 1 t 2 1 S C M  
Linearizing the CPI equation (3) and its foreign counterpart and considering the definition of 
the  home  country’s  terms  of  trade,  t ,  yields  equation  (15).
6  The  size  of  sector  II  in 
combination with the extent of the input bias causes long run deviations from purchasing 
power parity (PPP). In contrast to the paper by Warnock (2003), PPP does not necessarily 
hold in our model even if no bias exists ( 2 1 = a ). PPP only holds in the new steady state, if 
( ) 2 1 1 t = a - .
7 Then, the long run real exchange rate defined as  S P Q - D =  is constant.  
Equation (16) gives the optimal labour supply differential (log-linearized version of equation 
(8) and its foreign counterpart). An increase in the consumption differential ceteris paribus 
leads to a relatively stronger substitution of leisure for labor in the home country and thus to a 
fall in the labour supply differential. Relative labor supply is further positively affected by the 
long run change in the terms of trade as long as there is no extreme home input bias  ( ) 1 < a  
and inputs from abroad are needed in the production of domestic consumption goods ( ) 0 t > . 
In addition, log-linearizing the intermediate goods firms’ production function shows that the 
labour differential moves one to one with cross-country output (see equation (20)).  
                                                 
6  t t  is defined as  ( )
* = t t t t t p S p  so that an increase in  t t  represents an improvement in the terms of trade. 
7 For  1 t =  our model replicates the result of Warnock (2003) where long run deviations from PPP are caused by 
a home bias only.   10 
The consumption differential equals the relative production of consumption goods (equation 
17)).  The  share  of  the  consumption  goods  from  both  sectors  in  overall  consumption  is 
determined by the parameter t, which, as pointed out above, reflects the economies’ openness 
since it determines the relative size of the consumption goods sectors. The log-linearized 
version  of  the  long  run  current  account  equation  for  the  home  and  the  foreign  country 
(equation (14) and its foreign counterpart) leads to the conclusion that an improvement in the 
long run terms of trade and an increase in foreign long run indebtedness to the home country 
induces an increase in relative consumption and/or a decline in relative labor supply (see 
equation (18)). Intuitively, the effect of terms of trade changes increases if t increases (i.e. the 
openness  of  the  economies  increases)  and  the  input  bias  declines  so  that  the  countries’ 
interdependence increases. 
Equation (19) is obtained through linearizing the equilibrium conditions for home and foreign 
intermediate goods (equation (13) and its foreign counterpart). The relative demand for home 
intermediate goods grows with relative consumption as long as  ( ) 2 1 1 t < a - . This condition 
is more likely to be fulfilled if domestic inputs are predominantly needed for the production 
of domestic consumption goods (i.e. the home input bias is quite pronounced and t is quite 
small). The long run terms of trade change is negatively related to the relative intermediate 
goods output. An improvement (i.e. increase) in Home’s terms of trade causes an expenditure 
switching  effect  in  favor  of  foreign  goods.  The  strength  of  this  effect  increases  in  the 
substitutability of home and foreign goods (g), the economies’ openness (provided there is no 
large foreign input bias) and decreases in the extent of the home input bias.  
Changes  in  the  long  run  cross-country  money  demand  depend  on  relative  consumption 
changes and the long run CPI differential (equation (21)). In the new steady state, the real 
interest rate does not change,  0 r = . 
3.2 The Short Run  
In the short run, the intermediate goods prices are predetermined. They can only be adjusted 
in  the  new  steady  state.  Hence,  the  output  of  intermediate  goods  in  the  short  run  is  not 
governed by the labor-leisure trade-off in equation (8). Market demand is met at the pre-set 
price,  i.e.  output  of  intermediate  goods  is  determined  by  equation  (13).  Monopolistic   11 
competition provides a theoretical basis for output to accommodate demand because prices 
are set above marginal cost.
8 In the short run, the system is shocked by an unanticipated 
permanent  increase  in  the  relative  money  supply  of  the  home  country, 
0 M M M ˆ M ˆ > - = -
* * . Short run deviations from the initial steady state are denoted by hats 
over variables.  
Using the linearized version of the relative money demand equation (for the short and the 
long run) and the short run cross-country optimal consumption path (see below), it can be 
shown that the exchange rate immediately adjusts to its long run equilibrium value after a 
monetary shock ( S S ˆ = ).
9 Since the prices for intermediate goods cannot change in the short 
run ( 0 p ˆ p ˆ = =
* ), changes in the short run CPI can only be caused by (permanent) exchange 
rate changes,  ( ) S t 1 P ˆ a - = . 
Even if consumption goods are nontradeables, the CPI is not insulated from exchange rate 
changes if tradeable inputs are required in the production process. The strength of the CPI 
response, i.e., sensitivity of the CPI to nominal exchange rate movements, is determined by 
the  input  bias  and  by  the  relative  size  of  the  consumption  goods  sectors.  Intuitively,  the 
greater is the input bias, the weaker is the effect of exchange rate changes on the CPI. If there 
is an extreme input bias,  1 = a , the CPI does not react at all to exchange rate fluctuations. 
Similarly, if t converges to zero, so that all goods consumed stem from sector  II, which 
completely relies on domestically produced inputs, the impact of exchange rate changes on 
the CPI also vanishes independently of the input bias. Both the extent of the home bias and 
the existence of sector II lead to a violation of purchasing power parity in the short run. 
Unlike  Warnock’s  (2003)  paper,  the  short  run  real  exchange  rate, 
( ) ( )S 1 t 1 2 S P ˆ Q ˆ - a - = - D = , may change even if no bias exists and it may be a constant even 
if a bias exists. The relative size of the consumption goods sectors has to be adjusted suitably. 
                                                 
8 We asssume that the participation constraint is not violated. I.e., we only consider small shocks that do not push 
marginal costs above prices so that it is never optimal for firms to stop producing. See Corsetti and Pesenti 
(2001a) for a detailed analysis and interpretation of the participation constraint. 
9 In the more general case that the consumption elasticity of money demand is below unity, an overshooting of 
the exchange rate in response to a monetary shock is possible (see, e.g., Betts and Devereux 2000).   12 
The change in the intermediate good price index in the short run is  ( )S 1 P ˆ er int a - = . Thus, the 
response to exchange rate changes is higher on the intermediate goods than on the final goods 
level, which is consistent with empirical evidence (see the Introduction).  
The  remainder  of  the  log-linearized  model  in  the  short  run  in  terms  of  cross-country 
differences is 
(22)  ( ) ( ) P S P ˆ S ˆ C C ˆ D - - D - + D = D   
(23)  ( )
II I C ˆ t 1 C ˆ t C ˆ Y ˆ D - + D = D = D  
(24)  ( ) B 2 S 1 t 2 y ˆ C ˆ b - a - - = D - D  
(25)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) [ ]S 1 t 1 1 t 4 C ˆ 1 t 2 1 y ˆ ag + a - - a - + D a - - = D  
(26)  h ˆ y ˆ D = D  
(27)  ( )S 1 t 2 C ˆ M a - + D = D  
Equation (22) is the log-linearized version of the relative consumption paths (equation (6) and 
its foreign counterpart). If the real exchange rate moves immediately to its new steady state 
level, the consumption differential also reaches its long run value immediately after a shock. 
This is only the case if PPP holds (i.e.  ( ) 2 1 1 t = a -  as derived in the previous subection) so 
that changes in agents’ intertemporal allocation of consumption are identical across countries. 
Log-linearizing  the  consumption  market  equilibrium  conditions  shows  that  the  short  run 
consumption differential equals the relative production of consumption goods in the short run 
(equation (23). 
The  relative  short  run  movement  of  the  current  account  is  given  in  equation  (24).  A 
depreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  in  response  to  the  asymmetric  monetary  shock  ceteris 
paribus  leads  to  a  current  account  surplus  for  the  home  country.  A  larger  home  current 
account surplus of course means that Home  accumulates more net claims on the  foreign 
country (Bincreases) for a given change in the exchange rate.  
Equation (25) gives the linearized version of the equilibrium condition for home intermediate 
goods in the short run. The short run change in cross-country output positively depends on the   13 
change  in  the  short  run  consumption  differential  and  on  the  expenditure  switching  effect 
generated by the change in the exchange rate (the short run terms of trade deteriorate and are 
given by  S ˆ - = t ).
10 Of course, the substitution effect of exchange rate changes increases in 
the substitutability between home and foreign goods (g). If PPP holds, the short run output 
differential is exclusively driven by the input substitution of intermediate goods firms (second 
term on the r.h.s. of equation (25)). If, however, intermediate goods from abroad are not 
needed in home and foreign production processes ( 1 = a  and/or  0 t = ), the movement of 
relative home output is only governed by the change in the short run consumption differential.  
Equation (26) states that an one percent increase in labor input results in an equal increase in 
intermediate goods output in the short run. Finally, equation (27) shows that in the short run 
the  money  supply  differential  depends  on  the  short  run  consumption  differential  and  on 
exchange rate movements. This linearized version of the money demand equations also sheds 
some light on the model’s exchange rate dynamics if it is reformulated.  






The exchange rate only reacts to a monetary shock if at least some firms operate in sector I 
( 0 t > ) and the home bias for input goods is not extreme ( 1 < a ). If one of these conditions is 
not  met,  relative  money  supply  changes  only  lead  to  equal  changes  in  the  short  run 
consumption differential. If PPP holds, the exchange rate moves one to one with the increase 
in the money supply differential. For other values of  a and t, however, the volatility of the 
exchange rate may be higher or lower than the volatility of the money supply differential. The 
more dependent the home economy is on the rest of the world (t is relatively high and  a 
small), the weaker is the reaction of the exchange rate to relative money supply changes. The 
higher is the home input bias and the less open the economy (t is small) is, the more the 
exchange rate effect of monetary policy is exacerbated.  
                                                 
10 The movement of the short run terms of trade indicates that our set-up allows for a reconciliation of the works 
of Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000). In Betts and Devereux’ work, the limited 
degree of pass-through, based on the local currency pricing paradigm, leads to an improvement in the short run 
terms of trade when a country’s currency depreciates. This implication is not matched by the data as argued by 
Obtsfeld and Rogoff who therefore argue in favor of modelling full pass-through. In this paper, however, a 
limited pass-through is associated with a deterioration in the expanding country’s short run terms of trade.    14 
4  Closed Form Solutions 
4.1  Long Run Solution 
Closed form solutions for long run cross-country differences and individual variables are: 
(29)  ( )( )( )
M
1 1 1 t 2
y D
y
- g b - a - a
- = D . 
(30)  ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ]
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1 t 1 2 1 1 1 1 t 2
Y C D
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y
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where  ( )( )( ) 1 1 1 t 2 1 - g b - a - a + = y . The key variable for the long run effects of monetary 
policy is the change in Home’s net foreign asset position (equation (34), see also Appendix 
C).
11 Home accumulates net claims against Foreign in response to the monetary shock, giving 
rise  to  a  permanent  redistribution  of  wealth  from  Foreign  to  Home.  In  the  long  run,  the 
relative output of intermediate goods (and labor input) turns negative while the consumption 
differential is positive (equations (29) and (30)). Households in Home, as the net creditor 
country, decrease their labor supply and enjoy an increase in leisure (equation (31)). The 
home terms of trade improve in response to the monetary expansion (equation ((33)) and 
home households’ increased consumption spending is financed through the wealth transfer 
from abroad (equation (32)). Households in Foreign as the net debtor country, on the other 
                                                 
11 The change in the net foreign asset position can only be solved for with the help of the short run solutions 
presented in the next subsection. The permanent change in the net foreign position is caused by current account 
imbalances in the short run.    15 
hand, have to work more and reduce their consumption spending to be able to service their 
debt (see, e.g., Obstfeld and Rogoff 1995, 1996 for a more thorough exposition of the wealth 
effects of monetary policy).  
These long run effects of monetary policy crucially depend on the model’s key parameters, a 
and t. If  0 t = , Home’s net foreign position does not change in the long run so that monetary 
policy does not lead to an international transfer of wealth. In this case, neither country needs 
inputs from abroad. The interdependence of both countries on one another vanishes and Home 
and Foreign are closed economies.  B increases in t and ceteris paribus reaches its maximum 
for  1 t = . Analogously, the wealth effects of monetary policy disappear for an extreme home 
or foreign input bias ( 0 = a  or  1 = a ). An increase in the home input bias parameter,  a, 
enhances Home’s net foreign position as long as a foreign input bias prevails ( 5 . < a ) and 
reduces Home’s net foreign position if a home input bias exists ( 5 . > a ).  B gets largest and 
hence the permanent effects of monetary policy are strongest if no input bias exists ( 5 . = a ). 
If there is a strong bias in favor of home or foreign inputs, the input substitution between 
home and foreign intermediate goods brought about by a change in relative prices is rather 
weak. Consequently, the current account imbalances in the short run which give rise to the 
redistribution of wealth in the long run, are considerably weak. Firms are reluctant to switch 
between home and foreign goods since they (strongly) favor one type of good. If, however, 
there is no input bias, the movement in relative prices matters more. Now, firms have a strong 
incentive to substitute between foreign and home goods, giving rise to large current account 
imbalances in the short run and, hence, large changes in countries’ net foreign positions.  
Concerning individual and cross-country variables, money is not neutral even if prices are 
fully  flexible,  but  monetary  policy  has  no  global  real  effects.  Global  consumption  and 
intermediate good production is zero in the new steady state,  0 C
w =  and  0 y
w = , where the 
superscript  “w”  denotes  a  population-weighted  sum  of  home  and  foreign  variables 
( ( )
* + = X X 5 . X
w . The neutrality of money in the presence of price flexibility thus holds if 
worldwide (global) aggregates are considered.  
4.2  Short Run  
Relative short run changes in home country variables and in home individual variables in 
closed form are given by:   16 
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Equations (35) and (37) show that the output differential and home individual output move in 
exactly the opposite direction in the short run as compared to the long run. Home relative and 
individual output unambiguously increase in response to an increase in the relative home 
money supply.  For the  same reason as discussed above, the  change in  cross-country  and 
individual output reaches its maximum if  1 t =  and  5 . = a . Generally, home relative output 
increases more than one to one with the expansion of Home’s relative money supply as long 
as  the  adjustment  in  relative  prices  produces  an  input  substitution  effect  (i.e.  0 t >   and 
1 0 < a < ).  Otherwise,  the  (relative)  demand  for  inputs  is  not  affected  by  exchange  rate 
changes and the change in (relative) short run output is fully caused by the income effect of 
the relative monetary expansion. Equation (37), giving the short run change in home output, 
clearly shows the two distinct factors that impinge upon individual output movement. The 
expenditure increasing effect of a change in world demand is represented by 
w M  and the 
expenditure-switching effect of exchange rate fluctuations is reflected in the second term of 
the r.h.s of equation (37). Equation (40) shows that the exchange rate depreciates permanently 
in reponse to the (permanent) relative expansion of the home money supply. Generally, the 
switch away from foreign towards home inputs is stronger the higher  is the elasticity of 
substitution, g.   17 
The movement of home and foreign output in response to a monetary shock is further affected 
by the  exchange rate driven change in marginal costs. Since the law of one price holds, 
exchange  rate  changes  are  fully  passed-through  to  the  intermediate  goods  prices,  thus 
depressing output in the home country and increasing output in the foreign country for an 
expansion in the relative home money supply. Of course, the strength of this effect crucially 
depends on the input bias parameter a. Although the pass-through to individual goods prices 
is complete, marginal costs may be only weakly affected by exchange rate changes or may 
even be isolated from them if a considerable home bias ( 5 . > a ) or even an extreme input bias 
( 1 = a ) prevails. 
The short run consumption differential (36) and individual short run consumption (38) are 
subject to several effects. The increase in cross-country output and in home ouput implies an 
increase in home (relative) income. Part of this income increase is consumed, thus increasing 
home consumption relative to foreign consumption in the short run, and the remaining part is 
saved for consumption smoothing purposes (as discussed above, for  0 = a ,  1 = a  or  0 t = , 
the consumption path is unaffected by monetary policy adjustments, see equation (34)).  
Household’s optimal consumption path is affected by changes in the real interest rate. Home 
households’ incentive to save more (and consequently, to  consume less in the short run) 
positively depends on the real interest rate given in equation (39). If PPP holds, a monetary 
expansion  anywhere  in  the  world  leads  to  an  interest  rate  decrease  and  thus  reduces  the 
opportunity cost of short run consumption. If PPP is violated ( ( ) 2 1 1 t ¹ a - ), the real interest 
rate is further affected by the difference between the long run and the short run real exchange 
rate  reflected  in  the  second  term  in  brackets.  This  second  effect  has  an  ambiguous  sign 
rendering the interest rate response ambiguous, too. If the real exchange rate overshoots in the 
short run, it will appreciate from the short to the long run implying an increase in the real 
interest rate that Foreign has to pay for its debt in terms of foreign goods.
12 Thus, foreign 
households are given an incentive to borrow less from home households so that Home’s short 
run consumption ceteris paribus increases (the reverse argument applies to the undershooting 
case).  
                                                 
12 The real exchange overshoots in the short run if  ( ) 2 1 1 t < a -  and undershoots if  ( ) 2 1 1 t > a - .   18 
Moreover, due to the exchange rate depreciation Home is faced with a loss in its purchasing 
power while Foreign enjoys an increase in its purchasing power. This effect tends to suppress 
home consumption through the money market while foreign consumption is stimulated. The 
strength of this effect depends on how responsive the CPI is to exchange rate fluctuations 
which is determined by the relative size of the consumption goods sectors and the input bias. 
If  this  responsiveness  is  low  or  even  zero,  individual  consumption  and  the  consumption 
differential are (nearly) insulated from this real balances adjustment (if  0 t =  or  1 = a  we 
simply  have  M ˆ C ˆ = ).  The  change  in  home  and  foreign  purchasing  power  reaches  its 
maximum for  1 t =  and  0 = a . In this case, the loss in purchasing power is so severe that the 
change in the consumption differential is unambiguously negative ( M ˆ C ˆ D - = D ) and home 
consumption entirely depends on foreign monetary policy (
* = M ˆ C ˆ ). The effect of a change 
in the home money supply on home consumption is perfectly offset by the associated increase 
in the CPI. For intermediate values of the model’s key parameters t and a, the movement in 
the  consumption  differential  is  theoretically  not  unambiguous.  Globally,  however, 
consumption  and  output  (and  thus  effort)  unambiguously  increase  in  the  short  run, 
w w w M ˆ y ˆ C ˆ = = .  
5  Welfare  Effects  and  the  International  Transmission  of  Monetary 
Policy 
Equipped  with  the  long  run  and  the  short  run  solutions  we  can  now  turn  to  the  welfare 
analysis of monetary policy. Besides the welfare effect in the home country, the international 
transmission of monetary policy is of particular interest. On this basis, it can be assessed 
whether  countries  have  an  incentive  to  react  to  monetary  adjustments  in  a  neighboring 
country.  Therefore,  in  this  section  equations  for  the  foreign  country  are  (also)  presented. 
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1996) and others, we concentrate on the “real” part of 
households’ utility function and assume that the effect of real balances on utility is small 
enough to be neglected. Hence:  



















C ˆ dUt . 
The cross-country welfare change as well as home and foreign individual welfare changes are 
given by   19 
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Equations (43) – (45) show that the welfare consequences of monetary policy changes can be 
split up into two effects. First, a money supply change affects all countries equally through 
the expenditure increasing effect represented by the first terms in equations (44) and (45). Of 
course,  this  effect  cancels  out  if  relative  welfare  is  considered  (equation  (43)).  Second, 
countries are differently affected by the expenditure switching effect captured through the 
second  terms  in  equations  (44)  and  (45).  Globally,  the  welfare  gain  of  an  expansionary 
monetary policy anywhere in the world only depends on its expenditure increasing effect, 
( )
w w
t M 1 dV j = . 
For certain parameter values, the model is able to replicate the welfare results of other studies. 
For the special case,  5 . = a ,  1 t =  and  g = j , e.g., we have Obstfeld and Rogoff’s (1995) 
result that welfare in each country only depends on the global money  supply (
w M ) and 
monetary  policy  thus  has  prosper-thy-neighbor  and  prosper-thyself  effects.  Welfare  in  all 
countries would be equally affected by a monetary policy change anywhere in the world so 
that the cross-country difference of welfare changes is zero for these parameter settings.  
To better demonstrate the parameter dependence of the welfare results, a numerical example 
is  presented  in  the  following.  Parameter  values  apart  from  a  and  t  are  taken  from  the 
literature ( 94 . 0 = b ,  6 = j ).
13 Two scenarios are considered. In the first, the cross-country 
substitutability is comparatively low ( 5 . 1 = g ),
14 in the second the substitutability between 
home  and  foreign  inputs  is  assumed  to  be  relatively  high  ( 5 . 5 = g ).  Figures  1  and  2 
graphically present equations (44) and (45) for varying degrees of openness (t) and of the 
                                                 
13 See the numerical examples of, e.g., Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2002) 
and Warnock (2003).  
14 For consumption goods, the cross-country substitutability is estimated to lie between one and two (Backus, 
Kehoe and Kydland 1994).    20 
input bias (a). We assume a 1% permanent increase in the home money supply while the 
foreign money supply is held constant. 
A home monetary expansion may seriously deteriorate home welfare especially if the degree 
of  substitutability  between  home  and  foreign  inputs  is  low  (see  figures  1a  and  1b).  The 
beggar-thyself effect of monetary policy is largest if the mutual dependence of the economies 
on each other is quite high (i.e. if  a is close to zero and t is close to one). The long run 
welfare is still positive for these parameter values (albeit very small in magnitude since the 
redistribution of wealth is small for  a being close to one or zero). Home short run welfare, 
however,  is  negative  unless  the  impact  of  exchange  rate  changes  on  the  CPI  and  the 
intermediate goods price index is considerably restricted through a large home input bias 
(large value of a) and/or large relative size of the consumption goods sector that only needs 
domestic  inputs  (small  value  of  t).  An  increase  in  interdependence  is  associated  with  a 
stronger response of the CPI and the intermediate goods price to exchange rate movements. 
For  1 t =  and simultaneously  0 = a , both price indexes move one to one with the exchange 
rate. The resulting loss in consumers’ purchasing power prevents home real consumption 
from increasing in response to a home monetary expansion. Since the labor effort is still quite 
high in this situation (foreign firms demand domestic inputs), the short run and the overall 
welfare effect is negative. 
A monetary expansion tends to benefit the expanding country if there is a (strong) home input 
bias and/or t is rather small. For these combinations of the model’s key parameters, the links 
between both economies are rather weak and the welfare results therefore resemble those of 
closed economies (for  0 t =  or  1 = a , the economies are closed). Hence, a large home bias 
can “offset” a large degree of openness (reflected in a large t) and vice versa. These prosper-
thyself effects are small in magnitude compared to the beggar-thyself effects discussed above. 
The degree of substitutability between home and foreign goods  g does not change the results 
generally. The higher is  g, the larger are the positive long run welfare results of monetary 
policy since the redistribution of wealth in the long run from the foreign to the home country 
increases in  g (see equation (34)). Hence, monetary policy is beneficial for the home country 
for a wider range of parameter values. The conclusion can be drawn that an expansionary 
monetary policy seems to be a policy option only for relatively closed economies with only 
minor monopolistic distortions.   21 
Foreign welfare is improved for almost all parameter values by a home monetary expansion 
(see figures 2a and b). The more dependent the home country is on foreign inputs (the smaller 
a and, at the same time, the larger t) the more the foreign country profits from the home 
expansion. In the short run, foreign consumption increases quite strongly for this parameter 
combination while foreign effort, however, is hardly affected. Since, moreover, exchange rate 
changes generate only weak switching effects if there is a large input bias in either direction, 
the negative welfare consequences in the long run tend to be small. Thus, overall foreign 
welfare increases in the degree of openness, t, and decreases in the input bias parameter,  a. 
Of course, if the home country does not depend on inputs from abroad at all ( 0 t =  or  1 = a ), 
foreign welfare does not react to home monetary adjustments.  
For the welfare effects on the foreign country,  g is of key importance. Monetary policy only 
has beggar-thy-neighbor effects for a small range of parameter values if the substitutability 
between home and foreign goods is sufficiently high as in figure 2b. The negative long run 
effects of monetary policy on the foreign country’s welfare strongly increase in  g, since the 
foreign current account deficit increases in  g (see equation (34) again).
15 Although the short 
run  welfare  (which  is  unambiguously  positive,  independent  of  g)  increases  in  the  cross-
country substitutability as well, the long run welfare effect dominates for large values of both 
a and t (for this parameter combination both the short run decline in foreign effort and the 
increase  in  foreign  consumption  is  close  to  nil).  Hence,  foreign  overall  welfare  may  be 
adversely affected for these parameter values.  
With respect to the substitutability of home and foreign intermediate goods (g), one can 
conclude that the weaker the monopolistic distortions are (i.e. the larger is  g), the more likely 
it is that the conventional wisdom of beggar-thy-neighbor and prosper-thyself effects of an 
expansionary monetary policy holds.
16  
                                                 
15 If  1 = g  as in Corsetti and Pesenti (2001a), monetary policy has no long run effects at all since no current 
account imbalances arise and hence, no wealth transfer occurs in the long run. Monetary policy would now be 
unambiguously prosper-thy-neighbor in our model.  
16 Michaelis (2002) derives a similar result.   22 
6  Conclusion 
Using a fully dynamic new open economy macroeconomics model, this paper examines how 
the  existence  of  intermediate  goods  and  two  consumption  good  sectors  that  to  different 
degrees rely on inputs from abroad affect the transmission of monetary policy changes. We 
further assume that an equal input bias in the production of final consumption goods exists in 
the world. This set-up allows us to capture the logic of some of the most prominent extensions 
of the Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) model and to study their interaction.  
Key for the model’s results are the openness of the economies, the degree of interdependence 
and the competitiveness of markets. A monetary expansion is more likely to have a beneficial 
effect for the expanding country, the less open the expanding country is. Hence, monetary 
policy  has  prosper-thyself  effects  if  inputs  from  abroad  only  have  a  small  weight  in  the 
production  of  consumption  goods  (either  through  a  strong  input  bias  or  a  vast  share  of 
consumption goods in the consumption basket that are produced without foreign intermediate 
goods), making the country by and large independent of the rest of the world. Moreover, the 
likelihood of prosper-thyself effects increases with the competitiveness of markets. One is 
therefore led to the conclusion that a monetary expansions adversely affects the expanding 
country if it is strongly linked to its trading partners and/or the monopolistic distortions are 
quite strong. Concerning the welfare effects in the rest of the world, one can conclude that 
other economies are very rarely adversely affected by a monetary expansion in the home 
country. For a wide range of parameter values they even benefit. Beggar-thy-neighbor effects 
only occur for relatively competitive markets.  
There a many topics for further research based on the insights gained from our model. In 
particular in a stochastic version of the model several interesting issues can be addressed. 
Optimal  monetary  policy  in  response  to  shocks  and  the  model’s  implications  for  the 
international  dimension  of  monetary  policy  could  be  explored  as  well  as  the  model’s 
implications for the international coordination of monetary policy (along the lines of, e.g., 
Benigno 2001, Corsetti and Pesenti 2001b, Obstfeld and Rogoff 2002 and Sutherland 2002).   23 
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Figure 2b: The Welfare Effects of Monetary Policy on Foreign for  5 . 5 = g  
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Appendix 
A  Table 1: Equations for the foreign country 
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B  Table 2: The log-linearized model  
Variables  from  the  initial  symmetric  steady  state  are  indexed  by  the  subscript  “0”  and 
percentage deviations from it are denoted by  t X
~
, where  ( ) 0 0 t t X X X X
~
- = . The stock of 
bonds held by home and foreign agents is scaled by nominal consumption,  0 t t C dB B
~
= , 
since we assume that in the initial steady state no country has a net claim on the other one, 
0 B0 = .  Moreover,  the  real  interest  rate  is  tied  down  by  the  Euler  equation  (10)  so  that 
( ) b b - = 1 r0 . 
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C  Table 3: Solutions for the long run dependent on B  
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(C4)   ( )B 1 y b - - = D    28 
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